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A b s t r a c t 
In representative democracy, citizens with free vote, mainly political parties, elect their 
representatives to legislate, supervise, protect and make decisions that are in their interest. Given 
this, political leaders express the thoughts, wishes and will of the voters and act as their 
representatives when defending interest and making decisions that are related to the quality and the 
fate of their lives. Supporting their decisions can often be decisive for success and failure in their 
political career. Thus, in this paper work, it will be given views on how their decision-making is 
influenced by: leadership position and support from the coming party, constellation of political forces 
in parliament, achievement of a common platform and political consensus among political actors, 
constitutional norms, and broad civic support. 
 
The methodology used will be in harmony with the purpose of the study. Here will be an analysis of 
the behavior and actions of the two leaders within the constellation built in their country. In the 
course of this, this study will be oriented to the analysis of the political circumstances prevailing in 
the respective countries, the position of leadership within the party, the position and constitutional 
functions that favor one or the other, the distribution of political forces in the respective parliaments 
and many other moments. For this purpose, the interviews of the two leaders, the statements of the 
opposition leaders in the respective countries, the statements of prominent politicians, the other 
political and legal documents will be analyzed with which they will provide sufficient evidence on 
how they can be influenced in the process of the decision-making process during the Serbia-Kosovo 
Normalization negotiations. 
  
 
 
Introduction 
After the end of the Cold War, the number of wars between 
sovereign states has decreased, but the same cannot be said of 
wars within states, the number of which has increased and today 
they are the largest number of armed conflicts in the world. 
 
Nowadays, for international peace and security, the threat to 
peace and world security are sub state conflicts. These are armed 
conflicts within the borders of the state where certain ethnic 
groups under the umbrella of the principle of self-determination 
aim at secession and the creation of their state. 
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From the start of 1990 to the end of 1999 there were 118 armed 
conflicts worldwide, involving 80 states and two para-state 
regions and resulting in the death of approximately six million 
people (Smith, 2004). 
 
Holst has defined conflict as “a situation involving incompatible 
collective objectives and the possibility of armed conflict 
between two or more governments” (Holst, 1995). 
 
Unlike Holst, Goldstein has defined the conflict with the 
following words: “Conflict may be defined as a difference in 
preferred outcomes in a bargaining situation” (Joshua, 1994). 
 
From the abovementioned definitions, we note that conflicts are 
the result of disagreement and opposition of the parties on certain 
issues, whereas the negotiations imply the process of 
approximating the opposite positions by favoring the solution by 
peaceful means. 
 
In international relations, the attempt to resolve conflicts 
peacefully represents one of the most acceptable settlement 
processes between the parties. During this process, the parties are 
oriented towards finding a solution by creating a relaxing climate 
followed by the reduction of tensions by favoring the solution by 
peaceful means. 
 
This assertion is contained in Article 33 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, which states that "any dispute that endangers 
international peace and security would at first be tried to be 
resolved through negotiations, arbitration, judicial remedy and 
several other such means" (UN Charter, art, 33). 
 
Nowadays, negotiations are the simplest and most up-to-date way 
of solving post-conflict situations.  
 
According to Pillutla, negotiations are “The process through 
which two or more parties who are in conflict over outcomes 
attempt to reach an agreement. It is a constructive, positive 
alternative to haggling or arguing; it is aimed at building an 
agreement rather than winning a battle” (Pillutla, 2004). 
 
Meanwhile, former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger 
defined the negotiation as "a process of combining conflicting 
positions in a common position under a decision rule of 
unanimity" (Kissinger, 1969). 
 
Odel et al, conceptualize negotiation “as a process in which actors 
take steps to agree on an outcome, and every actor seeks to make 
that outcome as good as possible from their own perspective” 
(Maldonato, 2010). 
 
From the above definitions of negotiating by different authors, we 
conclude that negotiating involves the efforts of contradictory 
parties that have substantial differences between them to reach 
final solutions acceptable to both parties. 
 
Aristotle in his work Nicomachean Ethics‘defines the decision 
making process as a Deliberate Appetition, “which is a logical 
and psychological sequence that starts with desire, continues with 
violation and concludes with the act of choice” (Maldonato, 
2010). Seckler-Hudson, emphasize that “Decision making in a 
government is a plural activity. One individual may pronounce 
the decision, but may contribute to the process of reaching the 
decision. It is part of the political system" (Laxmikanth, 2011). 
 
Roth and Mullen the decision-making process considers as “a 
technique that is designed to help arrive at the best possible choice 
that satisfies that higher order values and goals that have been 
selected” (Byron, Myllen, 2002). 
 
During the negotiation process, leaders are in a situation where 
they need to make difficult decisions. Not always their decisions 
are welcome and sometimes even outdated. “There are on 
occasion leaders whose rationality may be questioned, but there 
are far fewer such individuals than those who are commonly 
labeled irrational. Hence, when seeking to explain foreign policy 
decisions, it is more fruitful to start with the assumption that the 
leaders who made these puzzling decisions were rational human 
beings trying their best to make “good” foreign policy decisions 
for their countries” (Tetlock,2004).  
 
Of course, when we carefully analyze the above statement, we 
will get an answer (though perhaps incomplete) of what motivates 
these leaders, what is the impact of the circumstances and which 
factors are determinants that have driven them to take these 
decisions. 
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During the negotiating process, the main goal of decision-making 
is to get the best out of this process, to reduce the losses to a 
minimum, and finally, the most important issue to solve the 
problem. 
 
Often decision-making means choosing the right options but, 
“Skeptics of good judgment in foreign policy decision making 
argue that the world is very complex and that, as a result, 
decisions often have many unintended consequences” 
(Tetlock,1992). 
 
According to Jensen, "the impact of personality on decision-
making is perhaps the most contentious (Jensen, 1982). The role 
of personality in foreign policy encompasses cognitive processes, 
background, personal characteristics, motives, and beliefs, and 
assumes that decision making is the result of individual ‘human 
agency’; that is, that ultimately, it is individuals who make 
decisions, not states” (Jensen, 1982). 
 
“Foreign policy decision making (FPDM) refers to the choices 
individuals, groups, and coalitions make that affect a nation’s 
actions on the international stage. Foreign policy decisions are 
typically characterized by high stakes, enormous uncertainty, and 
substantial risk” (Jonantan, Renshon, 20008). 
 
From the definitions made above, we can conclude that decision-
making is a process of choosing the best option, among the 
possible solutions taking into accounts the costs and 
consequences. 
 
So decision-making is a very important moment for every 
politician's political career and for the country's destiny. 
According to Lin, decision-making is a common behavior that is 
present in economic, political life and is a form of practice that 
often occurs in management activities whose ultimate purpose is 
to attain a specific goal (Lin, 2016). Therefore, the solution for 
which leaders are determined must be endorsed by individuals, 
institutions, political parties, even the citizens themselves, so 
when they are determined for a solution, they certainly consider 
this fact. It can be said that from political psychology researchers, 
a general consensus has been reached that politicians' decision-
making relies on their personality as "their individual pattern of 
integration of processes of perception, memory, judgment, goal-
seeking, and emotional expression and regulation " (Winter, 
2009), but what this paper seeks to offer is that the political 
constellation in which they operate is also of great importance as 
it has a decisive significance in the behavior and decision-making 
of political leaders during the negotiations. 
 
The political decision-making process has to do with decisions on 
important political issues or social issues that affect both 
internally and internationally, so the decision-making subjects 
that are leaders of a political party, state or government leaders, 
or even military leaders, should have a strong support when 
making their own decisions. 
 
Leadership, studies of its role and importance in negotiations are 
numerous and theories have been raised. Our goal in this seminar 
paper is to show that the negotiation process is very complex, 
does not depend solely on the attitudes and behavior of the leader, 
but they are influenced by both; domestic and international 
circumstances and factors. 
 
In his work “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte”, Marx 
wrote, “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as 
they please; they do not make it under self-selected 
circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given 
and transmitted from the past” (Marx, 1852). 
 
Meanwhile, Spencer argued, “[We] must admit that the genesis 
of a great man depends on the long series of complex influences 
which has produced the race in which he appears and the social 
state into which that race has slowly grown... Before he can 
remake his society, his society must make him”(Herbert, Spencer, 
1986). 
 
During the negotiations, Putnam points out that the leaders, “[At] 
the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by 
pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and 
politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those 
groups. At the international level, national governments seek to 
maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while 
minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign 
developments”(Putnam, 1984). 
 
The purpose of this paper work is to show that in the Serbia-
Kosovo negotiation process, the behavior and actions of the two 
leaders are influenced by the political constellation built in their 
countries. As such, this study will be oriented to the analysis of 
the political circumstances that reign in the respective countries, 
the position of leadership within the party, the position and 
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constitutional functions that favor one or the other, the 
distribution of political forces in respective parliaments and many 
other moments. With the sole purpose of contributing to filling 
the gap in knowledge about the influence of political constellation 
in leadership behavior and decision making, I expect this paper to 
provide sufficient evidence of how both leaders are influenced in 
their decision-making process during the process Normalization 
of Serbia-Kosovo Relations. 
 
The subject of the study is two presidents; Serbian President 
Aleksandar Vučić and Kosovo President, Hashim Thaçi. The 
study will analyze their path of promotion in the political career, 
the position of the two leaders they had in their parties before 
being elected president, the role and constitutional functions, the 
report of the political forces in the perspective parliaments, and 
the broad civic support. It will also analyze the political 
statements and interviews of party leaders and state institutions, 
relevant to the topic. 
 
In this paper work, with the notion of political constellation, we 
understand the political circumstances in which the two leaders 
act during the negotiation process for normalization of Serbia-
Kosovo relations, the political power of the leaders within the 
party, which they have the main support, the support of political 
forces in parliament, support from citizens, as well as the 
constitutional function and norms that influence the process of 
political negotiation and final decision-making. Acting under 
these circumstances, they must make decisions that respond to 
their claims, arguments, proposals, and expectations, in order to 
reach a final and legally binding agreement on the parties. 
 
Also, achieving a domestic political consensus is necessary 
considering the many difficulties faced by both leaders during 
bilateral negotiations. The importance of this process, for both 
sides, highlights the need for broad co-operation within the local 
political spectrum, co-operation between political actors, interest 
groups and citizens, for the creation of a common political 
platform that will overcome the partial differences and harmonize 
positions on a negotiated political agreement. 
 
With the Serbia-Kosovo Relations Normalization Agreement, 
this paper implies an agreement that is viable, sustainable and that 
does not create instability in both countries, but also in the region. 
Through this legal agreement, binding on the parties, Serbia 
would accept Kosovo's international subjectivity, would not 
prevent it in the integration processes, would not hinder Kosovo's 
membership in international institutions and mechanisms, and 
would pave the way for membership in the EU, while the Serbian 
minority in Kosovo, through the Association of Serb Majority 
Municipalities, will be enabled to represent the collective 
interests of ethnic Serbs, in particular in the fields of education, 
health, urban and rural planning and economy. 
 
1. Internal party support for the leader  
Of course, one of the most important moments, during the 
political career of the leaders, is the taking and enforcement of 
decisions. When they make their own decisions "they do so in 
different ways, such as seeking followers' thoughts and making 
decisions together" (Yukl, 2010). 
 
The political decision-making of the leader is largely influenced 
by the role and support within the political party. Much more, that 
a party is dominated by its leadership, towards other members, its 
decisions become more acceptable. The political decision-
making of the leader is largely influenced by the role and support 
within the political party. How much is voted and the more a party 
is dominated by its leadership, towards other members, its 
decisions become more acceptable. 
 
The Democratic Party of Kosovo is a political party formed after 
the end of the war in 1999 by KLA leaders, most of whom until 
then were activists and leaders of the People's Movement of 
Kosovo. From the foundation until the resignation of him, 
Hashim Thaçi was in charge of it. After resigning from the post 
of president, Kadri Veseli, a close associate of Thaçi, was led by 
PDK after the election of President of Kosovo. 
 
Table 1. Number of votes of PDK and its leader Thaçi 
Year   Nr. of 
voters 
PDK 
votes 
% 
votes 
Seats  Thaçi’s 
votes 
2004 699519 119 
112 
28,85 30  
2007 628630 196 
207 
34,3 37 105378 
2010 698751 224 
339 
32,11 34 160850 
2014 734055 222 
181 
30,39 37 166422 
2017 727986 245 
627 
33.74 23  
Source: Central Election Commission of Kosovo 
  15 
From the analysis of these statistics, we can see that Hashim Thaçi 
was an indisputable leader in PDK and his political career had a 
constant up until his election as President of Kosovo. What is 
apparent to PDK is that in the last elections it entered a large pre-
election coalition with the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo and 
the Initiative for Kosovo with the sole aim of getting out in the 
elections. So there was a coalition of war parties with the sole aim 
of gaining power. This proved to be successful for the coalition, 
but not for PDK. From these elections she won only 23 seats in 
parliament, which could be a little support for President Thaçi's 
decision-making. Even more difficult is the fact that within this 
brisk coalition there are many differences and disagreements. 
 
Table 2. Number of SRS votes 
Year   Nr. of voters SRS votes % votes Seats 
2008 4 141 176 1 219 436 453 29,36 78 
2012 3 739 317 180 558 4.61 0 
2014 3 592 375  1 736 920 48.35 158 
2016 3 667 915 1 823 147 48.25 131 
Source: Elections for the National People's Assembly of the 
National Assembly of Serbia 
 
Table 3. Number of votes for Nikolić and Tadić 
Year  Candidate  Proposer  Nr. of 
votes  
% 
votes 
January 
2008  
T. Nikolić SRS 1 646 172 39,99 
B. Tadić DS 1 681 528 53,24 
 
Source: Elections for the National People's Assembly of the 
National Assembly of Serbia 
 
Table 4. Votes of Serbian presidents until Vucic is elected 
president of Serbia 
February 
2008 
T. 
Nikolić 
SRS  2 197 155 
47 9 
48,81 
B. Tadić DS 2.304.467 
50,31 
51.19 
May  06 
2012 
T. 
Nikolić 
SNS 979 216 25,05 
B.Tadić DS 989 454 
 
25,31 
May 20 
2012 
T. 
Nikolić 
SNS 1 552 063 49,54 
B. Tadić DS 1 481 952 47,31 
April 2017 A. Vučić  Coalition 
SNS... 
2 012 788 55,08 
Sasa 
Jankovic 
Citizens' 
Group For 
Serbia 
Without 
Strain 
597 728 16,36 
Source: Elections for the National People's Assembly of the 
National Assembly of Serbia 
 
For change, Aleksandar Vučić was not the leader of the party. He 
entered the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) in 1993 and after the 
election he was a member of the National Assembly. In 1995 he 
was elected secretary general of the SRS. In March 1998, Vučić 
was appointed Minister of Information in the Government of 
Mirko Marjanović (Narod koji ima najkraće pamćenje na svetu 
http://www.prekoramena.com/t.item.459/Vučić-o-cenzuri-
medija.html). 
 
Following the dismissal of Tomislav Nikolić from the Serbian 
Radical Party, on September 12, 2008, Vučić, one of the most 
popular figures among SRS supporters, resigned from Radical 
Party on 14 September 2008. Vučić briefly served as Minister of 
Defense and First Deputy Prime Minister from July 2012 to 
August 2013, when he stepped down from his position as Defense 
Minister in a cabinet reshuffle. Although the Prime Minister, 
Ivica Dačić, held formal power as head-of-government, many 
analysts thought that Vučić had the most influence in government 
as head of the largest party in the ruling coalition and parliament. 
 
Before his tenure as his country's president Vučić served as prime 
minister of Serbia in two terms from 2014-2016 and from 2016 
to 2017, as well as the Deputy Prime Minister from 2012 to 2014. 
 
2. Political consensus and the establishment of unity 
for talks 
 
Political consensus among the parties plays an important role in 
decision-making of leaders in the negotiation process. It plays an 
extremely important role in the quality of decision-making of 
presidents, especially in countries with parliamentary democracy 
such as Serbia and Kosovo. In a post-conflict society and a lack 
of democracy environment, they can be crucial to political 
stability as "the parties are objects of civic loyalty, voter 
mobilizers, and key actors in democratic politics"(Montero, 
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Rashmond, 200). They represent different segments of society 
and their interests. For the parties and citizens of both states, this 
is the first time that negotiations on vital issues are negotiated in 
this format. Also, parties are a key element in decision-making, 
as any agreement should be ratified in the respective parliaments, 
so without their vote in parliament, the agreement would have no 
value. To achieve progress in negotiations, the constituency 
between political parties can be very useful. Under these 
conditions, consensus is indispensable to the fact that actors 
within political parties are the same people who fight each other 
for political power. 
 
Certainly, such support within the party is necessary for the leader 
when making important decisions for the country and signing 
international agreements when it is known that they are the most 
common and acceptable form of finding a solution after each 
dispute, conflict or war. 
 
Negotiations are laborious and lengthy processes in which the 
participating parties seek to produce a more favorable outcome, 
namely, making a decision and signing an agreement that should 
be fully acceptable to the community to which it is intended. 
One of the main problems in the negotiation process is that the 
expectations from the conclusion of these negotiations for the 
main actors within the community are different. So, leaders, 
participants in the negotiations, think not only of what they are 
going to do in a negotiation but also of the likelihood that such an 
agreement will be accepted by the community and respected in 
the future. An unacceptable community agreement will certainly 
not be accepted, and in this case, it will not be ratified by the 
Kosovo Parliament or will not go to a referendum in Serbia. 
Moreover, it can cause political problems in the career of the 
leader. In order to amputate the dissatisfaction and eventual 
concerns that may arise as a result of decision-making, leaders in 
the negotiation process try to involve as many institutional, 
political and social actors as possible, that the decision is 
welcomed and gained support. Involvement of a greater number 
of political and social actors in the negotiation and decision-
making process can be understood as their assessment by the 
political leader and as part of decision-making. 
 
Creating a political platform, from the respective assemblies, 
where would lay down principles, negotiating leaders, issues to 
be negotiated, and defining red lines for which to negotiate and 
for what no, would be a relief in decision-making for two leaders. 
Some of the political parties in Kosovo and Serbia persistently 
refuse to discuss issues that they consider to be internal, a stance 
that the development of negotiations for normalization of Serbia-
Kosovo relations makes it even harder for leaders in the talks. 
These negotiations, in one of the largest opposition parties in 
Kosovo, ‘Vetevendosje’, are a betrayal of the country. Since the 
beginning they were considered technical, but turned out to be 
political, and very sensitive issues are being discussed, dealing 
with the status of Kosovo and its territory.  
 
President Thaçi's frequent recent public appearances, where he is 
revealing some of his confusing, unstable, improvised and 
uncertain ideas, have stirred confusion, dissatisfaction and 
tension in public opinion and the political scene. This confusion, 
this instability, this improvisation is a clear and complete 
expression that Thaçi is unprepared for decision-making, and 
there is no clear idea and strategy for completing these 
negotiations. At this moment, Thaçi is alone, without 
constitutional basis and without institutional, political and public 
support, national and international (Bashkurti, 2018). Given this 
data, it is imperative to create a political platform with inter-party 
cooperation and the creation of a unity group. This would enable 
representation of all political parties and interest groups, and 
consensus could be reached more easily on difficult issues. 
 
Having been in such a situation since the opposition categorically 
opposes the talks to be chaired by President Hashim Thaçi, and 
knowing that a comprehensive Kosovo-Serbia agreement is a 
condition for the two countries to integrate into the EU, he has 
given such a proposal, but have not found support for political 
actors and other interest groups. 
 
In support of this idea, it was proposed to hold an extraordinary 
session by the Kosovo Parliament, proposed by the government, 
to discuss the negotiating team that will participate in the dialogue 
with Serbia in Brussels. Failures came about because of the lack 
of quorum for holding this session. Efforts to continue the session 
failed several more times. On the other hand, an extraordinary 
session was called for by the opposition, which required the 
adoption of a resolution that would be forbidden to President 
Hashim Thaçi to take part in the dialogue with Serbia, which also 
failed to be held. 
 
The refusal to negotiate the establishment of this group was 
justified by the fact that Thaçi has continued the talks 
independently without the approval of the Kosovo Parliament. In 
these talks, he has no clear idea of what should be negotiated with 
this deal. In his frequent public appearances, he is becoming 
confused, unstable, improvised and uncertain, which means that 
he has no doctrine or strategy before himself. Once it declares 
'border correction', another time 'border change', continuing with 
'territorial exchange', times 'exception of Kosovo division', 
sometimes 'joining the Presevo Valley with Kosovo'. This 
confusion, this instability, has raised dissatisfaction with public 
opinion and the Kosovar political spectrum. 
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The unity group, in mutual co-operation with the president, would 
create an agenda; where through conferences, declarations, 
negotiating tables, etc., would clarify and make the political 
platform acceptable to the interest groups, political parties and the 
public opinion, which the parliament would vote later. 
 
Regarding the clarity of the final settlement with Kosovo, it seems 
that it lacks President Vučić. In his statements, he says, "I will do 
my best, but it is a long road full of thorns and problems ahead" 
(Serbia’sVučić says long road ahead in talks with Kosovo 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/serbias-
Vučić-says-long-road-ahead-in-talks-with-kosovo/) since in his 
plan for the final solution there are many unknowns, for the public 
and political opinion as well as for itself. 
 
He stresses that a solution must be found and an agreement 
reached. During these days, he had mentioned the possibility of 
an agreement in which a land swap would be possible. Serbia 
would be enabled to take the northern part of Kosovo, which is 
predominantly populated by Serbs. In return, Belgrade would 
hand over southern municipalities mostly populated by ethnic 
Albanians in Kosovo, an idea which later did not stand in its 
vocabulary and in media spaces. 
 
In favor of idea of unity, the Government of the Republic of 
Serbia has adopted a decision to create a Working Group for the 
development of a strategic document for the development of the 
public information system in the Republic of Serbia. 
 
In support of Serbia-Kosovo negotiations and in support of 
President Vučić, the Serbian government has stated that it will 
soon choose a working group that will be responsible for Serbian 
President Aleksandar Vučić's logistical support during the 
Kosovo's internal dialogue. 
 
While support for Serbian President Vučić is not lacking, the 
same cannot be said of Kosovo's President Thaçi. 
 
The extraordinary session of the Kosovo Parliament, summoned 
by the ruling parties, in support of President Thaçi and aimed at 
ratifying the negotiating team proposed by the Kosovo 
government failed twice. 
 
A day later, after some attempts to make the necessary quorum, 
the session called by opposition parties that attempted to ban the 
president to talk about Kosovo's borders was also fired by a 
resolution failed. 
 
Such sensitive situations in the Kosovo Parliament, where the 
parties in the coalition are not giving the support to President 
Thaçi for these talks, put him in a more unfavorable position 
compared to the Serbian President Vučić and have a profound 
influence on his decision-making. 
 
3. The lack of transparency 
In addition, in the talks on normalization of Serbia-Kosovo 
Relations, as from political parties, interest groups and public 
opinion, the most frequent remarks were for lack of transparency. 
Kosovo and Serbia have started talks on normalizing relations 
between them since 2011. Initially, mediated by the European 
Union, these talks began as talks on technical issues, and are now 
continuing in another format, beyond technical issues. 
 
“Transparency includes making it clear who is taking the 
decisions, what the measures are, who is gaining from them, and 
who is paying for them. This is contrasted with opaque policy 
measures, where it is hard to discover who takes the decisions, 
what they are, and who gains and who loses” (Hood, 2006). 
 
Nowadays transparency is understood as a concept that involves 
the process of accountability, impartiality and the rule of law. By 
Christopher Hood, the concept of transparency is defined 
"broadest doctrine of openness" or "... the doctrine that the 
general conduct of executive government should be predictable 
and operate according to published (and as far as possible non-
discretionary) rules rather than arbitrarily" (Hood, 2006). 
 
Both presidents, such as Thaçi and Vučić, point out that they are 
in the final stages of the dialogue, which is aimed at completing 
this process by a legally binding agreement on both sides by 
which a final solution would be reached and reconciliation would 
be made between the two states, emphasized remains the lack of 
transparency made these talks. "The lack of transparency, the 
failure to publish the treaties, the different treatment the parties 
have made to the agreements, calling them as a consensus, 
sometimes as a conclusion, the constructive ambiguity as a 
concept for the accommodation of the parties, their non-signing 
or not their ratification in the Assembly, has made the process 
unclear and has left the parties discretion in interpreting in the 
first place and their unwillingness to implement them" (http://kdi-
kosova.org/aktivitetet/sondazhi-i-kdi-kuvendi-te-fuqizohet-
marreveshjet-e-dialogut-te-zbatohen/).   
 
The same situation is happening with the information of public 
opinion and political parties in Serbia. Such a non-transparent 
process, not only to citizens, political parties but also to the 
respective assemblies, questions the legitimacy of the parties in 
the talks and makes it difficult to accept such an agreement. "The 
process itself is not transparent, which raises a question about its 
legitimacy" (Serbia Not Transparent over Kosovo Deals, Report 
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Says, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/brussels-
agreement-implementation-slow-and-not-transparent-report-
says/1589/77). 
 
4. Constitutional Framework 
The position of the two presidents in the negotiating process is 
closely related to the constitutional legal basis and the functions 
of the presidents established under these constitutions. 
 
Both countries, like Serbia, as well as Kosovo, are the 
parliamentary republic. Despite the similarities that exist in the 
exercise of presidential functions, to the two presidents. The 
constitutional statuses of the presidents of the two countries vary. 
The president of Serbia is directly elected by the people. As such, 
he is a direct representative of the sovereign as well as the Serbian 
Parliament. The president of Serbia, as a representative of the 
sovereign, has a broader and stronger legitimacy of Serbia's 
representation in international relations as well. Though, like in 
any such political system, the principle of 'check and balance' 
forces even the president of Serbia to find joint decision-making 
with the Serbian Parliament, where all the international 
negotiations negotiated and signed by the Serbian president are 
ultimately ratified (Bashkurti, 2018). 
 
Meanwhile, the President of Kosovo is elected by parliament, "by 
two-thirds (2/3) of the votes of all deputies of the Assembly" and 
"If no candidate receives a two-thirds majority (2/3) in the first 
two ballots, is the third ballot between the two candidates who 
have received the highest number of votes in the second ballot 
and the candidate who receives the majority of the votes of all 
deputies " (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo), is elected 
president of Kosovo. That's what happened. Such a president is 
not a direct representative of the people, so the sovereignty of 
Kosovo lies in the Kosovo Parliament. This makes Kosovo a 
parliamentary republic and the powers of the President of 
Kosovo, limited to the international representation of Kosovo. 
Making foreign policy and decision-making in the Republic of 
Kosovo are inter-institutional and depend on the Parliament and 
the Foreign Policy Committee, the Government and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the President and the Constitutional Court. All 
of these in their entirety are included in the policy-making and 
decision-making of Kosovo's foreign policy. So the President of 
Kosovo or anyone else, who would sign an international 
agreement, in this case with Serbia, should take into account all 
the aforementioned institutions. 
 
Certainly, an agreement that would not be welcomed by these 
institutions would not be ratified in parliament, it would be a 
matter for the Constitutional Court of Kosovo and would put 
Kosovo into a deep political crisis and in particular would have a 
negative for the fate of President Thaçi himself. 
 
 
Conclusion  
The purpose of this paper was to explain the impact of political 
constellation on the decision-making of leaders, participants in 
Serbia-Kosovo relations normalization talks, presidents Vučić 
and Thaçi. In an attempt to better reflect influencing factors, 
numerous studies have been conducted on the decision-making 
and leadership process, the position of two leaders in their 
political parties and career advancement, the relationship between 
political parties and their representatives has been analyzed are 
their supporters, analyzed their institutional and constitutional 
position, and the support they can enjoy in the respective 
parliaments. 
 
Decision-making as a process, which itself includes a range of 
actions and activities that identify the problem, the ways of 
solving it, and the consequences that may result from the solution. 
The political decision-making process is about making decisions 
on important political issues that have implications both 
domestically and internationally. Finding in such situations, 
political decision-makers must have a strong support when 
making their own decisions. 
 
Political decision-making is not just a definition for a better 
solution than many other alternatives, but is also influenced by 
many factors related to the political constellation in which leaders 
find and carry out their activities. It is a dynamic political process 
regarding the taking and enforcement of major decisions 
regarding the fate of the two states. The solution is not just for 
them and does not depend solely on their will; it is crucial to 
nations, political parties, interest groups and as such includes 
many aspects. 
 
Based on the arguments provided above, we may conclude that; 
in these talks, the position of Serbian President Vučić is more 
favorable than that of Kosovo's President, Thaçi. 
 
For President Thaçi, political support, from the coming party and 
ruling coalition is different from what was at the beginning of his 
rise to political career. Decision-making in Kosovo's foreign 
policy is done by a range of institutions as; The Parliament, the 
Foreign Policy Committee, the Government and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, from the Constitutional Court, which is also 
involved in the matter, and the President is elected by the 
Parliament of Kosovo. By contrast, the political support that 
Vučić enjoys in Serbia is great; he had a rise in the political career 
that is now in the zenith, his support from the political subject 
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from where he comes is not lacking, also the support of the 
Government and the Parliament is complete, and the greatest 
support can come from the people, when it is known that he has 
become president of direct elections. 
 
All these arguments point out that the position of the two leaders 
in these negotiations varies. But that does not mean that; 
Negotiators in the negotiating strategy should not compile their 
negotiating form, create a unity group or any other group in 
support of their negotiations, and consider this whole set of 
policy-making and decision-making institutions at the time of 
signing an agreement. Without considering these factors, their 
agreement would be unacceptable, illegitimate and impracticable. 
As such, instead of generating improvement of inter-neighborly 
relations across the Balkans and beyond, it could put both 
countries in the internal political crisis with consequences beyond 
their borders. 
 
Decision-making is a very important process, both for its object, 
as well as for the fate itself of the leader. In this case, the most 
important thing for the two leaders at this moment is their ability 
to create a supportive climate from key actors in the political and 
social life of the country. 
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